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below a system of law, in its margins and may be 
even against it’.1
 In terms of urban ordering, normalisation 
includes attempts to establish spatial relations that 
encourage social relations and forms of behaviour, 
which are meant to be repeatable, predictable and 
compatible with the taxonomy of the necessary 
social roles. Normalisation shapes human behav-
iour and may use space (as well as other means) to 
do so. 
 Normalisation is a project and also a stake. 
It is not simply imposed on populations; it has to 
infiltrate every capillary of society in order to be 
effective. It has to be connected to words and acts 
that mould everydayness, but also to acts of domi-
nant power that frame those everyday molecular 
practices. Normalisation is undoubtedly a project of 
domination, a project that seeks to mould society’s 
subjects, and thus it has to be the result of a certain 
arrangement of power relations. 
 Before the current economic crisis, the governing 
elites thought they had reached the capitalist 
heaven, where money magically begets money.2 
They imagined that they could at last do away 
with the obstacles to profit that labour creates. As 
the economic ‘bubbles’ burst, the importance of 
mechanisms that bind people to dominant policies 
once again became evident. It is these policies that 
currently shape the normalisation project through 
their focus on two important targets. The first of 
Common spaces and the urban order of the 
‘city of enclaves’
The city must be controlled and shaped by domi-
nant power relations if it is to remain a crucial 
means for society’s reproduction. But the city is not 
simply the result of spatiotemporal ordering in the 
same way that society is not simply the result of 
social ordering. Order, social or urban, is a project 
rather than an accomplished state. Therefore it is 
important that we locate the mechanisms through 
which the project of urban ordering is being shaped 
and implemented if we want to discover the forces 
that resist or overturn this ordering. Ordering mech-
anisms do not simply execute certain programmed 
functions but constitute complicated, self-regulating 
systems that interact with urban reality and ‘learn’ 
from their mistakes. Urban ordering, the metropolis 
itself, is a process, a stake, much in the same way 
that dominant social relations need to be repro-
duced every day. 
 Urban order is the impossible limit towards which 
practices of spatial classification and hierarchisa-
tion tend in order to ensure that the city produces 
those spatial relations that are necessary for capi-
talism’s reproduction. Ordering mechanisms are not 
only meant to tame a complicated and highly differ-
entiated form of human habitat (perhaps the most 
complicated one in human history so far), they are 
also, to use Foucault’s bold term, ‘mechanisms of 
social normalisation’. Foucault insists that normali-
sation is not simply the result of the legal system: 
‘techniques of normalization develop from and 
Common Space as Threshold Space: 
Urban Commoning in Struggles to Re-appropriate Public Space
Stavros Stavrides
10
decisions. The contemporary metropolis is ‘an 
archipelago of “normalized enclosures”’.4
 Immersed in their everyday, enclave-defined 
lives, people tend to accept each enclave’s rules of 
use as an indisputable normality. They even under-
stand these rules of use as the functional decrees 
of well-intentioned authorities. They abandon 
themselves to the promises of those rules, which 
guarantee what law is supposed to guarantee: 
protection. People learn to abandon their rights in 
exchange for this protection. And, of course, protec-
tion (from whatever the authorities present to people 
as a threat) is the deepest and most consistent alibi 
used to make rules seem ‘natural’.5
 Yet urban ordering and the corresponding 
normalisation policies do not go unchallenged. 
Actually, a widespread – albeit latent – loss of 
faith in this society’s promises has triggered 
various forms of disobedience and resistance. 
Normalisation remains a contested and precarious 
project in a period of crisis with no apparent way 
out. Emergent new forms of resistance are impor-
tantly connected to acts that shape urban space in 
order to create new social bonds and build forms of 
collective struggle and survival.
 Practices of this kind lead to collective experi-
ences that reclaim the city as a potentially liberating 
environment and reshape crucial questions that 
characterise emancipatory politics. In this context, 
the city becomes not only the setting but also the 
means to collectively experiment with possible 
alternative forms of social organisation. Moreover, 
the sharing of space becomes a crucially important 
stake, both as a means of experimenting and as 
one of the goals of such experiments.
 Common spaces are those spaces produced by 
people in their effort to establish a common world 
that houses, supports and expresses the commu-
nity they participate in. Therefore, common spaces 
these is to ensure that social bonds continue to 
treat individuals as economic subjects, as subjects 
whose behaviour and motives can be analysed, 
channelled, predicted and, ultimately, controlled 
by the use of economic parameters and measures 
alone. The second is to ensure that people continue 
to act and dream without participating in any form 
of connectedness or coordination with others that 
does not contribute to the creation of profit. 
 Both targets are strongly connected to the hege-
monic shaping of the contemporary metropolis. It 
is the control of this urban environment that aims 
to preserve our society’s precarious balance by 
ensuring that people continue to act as selfish and 
obedient individuals. The powerful live and work 
in fortified citadels. The rest are offered either the 
doubtful security of enclosed spaces of consump-
tion and living, or are forced to work and spend 
their lives in areas circumscribed by sanitised urban 
zones. Urban ordering is therefore oriented towards 
the expansive urbanity of a ‘city of enclaves’. Urban 
enclaves tend to be self-contained worlds in which 
specific forms of spatial ordering prevail.3 Ordering 
is guaranteed by rules that apply only inside each 
enclave. A peculiar, site-specific sovereign power is 
thus established in urban enclaves in the form of an 
administrative apparatus that imposes obligations 
and patterns of behaviour, and therefore defines the 
characteristics of the enclave’s inhabitants.
 Specific rules are applied in the ordering of a 
large department store, in the way one enters a 
bank or a corporate tower, and in the layout and 
use of a shopping mall or a huge sports stadium. 
Urban islands may be huge building complexes, 
like the ones described above, but also whole 
neighbourhoods, as in the case of so-called ‘gated 
communities’. Spatial ordering is connected with 
behaviour normalisation in all cases. Normalisation 
is explicitly or implicitly performed through the 
enforcement of regulations, which often present 
themselves as purely innocent management 
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try to secure its reproduction but also attempts to 
enrich its exchanges with other communities as well 
as those between its members. Common space 
may take the form of a meeting ground, an area in 
which ‘expansive circuits of encounter’ intersect.8 
Through acts of establishing common spaces, the 
discrimination and barriers that characterise the 
enclave urbanity may be countered.
 In the prospect of re-appropriating the city, 
common spaces are the spatial nodes through 
which the metropolis once again becomes the site 
of politics, if by politics we mean an open process 
through which the dominant forms of living together 
are questioned and potentially transformed. The 
following is a description of the collective experi-
ence of re-appropriating the metropolis by a group 
that almost ignited Gezi Park occupation in Istanbul, 
Turkey, in their struggle to defend a park that was 
to be destroyed by the government’s plans. ‘The 
struggle for Gezi Park and Taksim Square set a new 
definition of what public space means. Reclaiming 
Taksim has shattered AKP’s [governing party] 
hegemony in deciding what a square is supposed 
to mean for us citizens, because Taksim is now 
what the Resistance wants it to mean: our public 
square.’9 Interestingly, the group’s name translates 
as ‘Our Commons’.
 The prevailing experiences of urban enclo-
sures, and the dominant vision of recognisable, 
identity-imposing enclaves, colonise the thought 
and actions of those who attempt to reclaim poli-
tics. We need to abandon a view that fantasises 
about uncontaminated enclaves of emancipation.10 
Threshold experience and the threshold metaphor 
offer a counter-example to the dominant enclave 
city.11 Rather than perpetuating an image of such 
a city as an archipelago of enclave-islands, we 
need to create spaces that inventively threaten 
this peculiar urban order by overturning dominant 
taxonomies of spaces and life types. Spaces-as-
thresholds acquire a dubious, perhaps precarious, 
should be distinguished from both public spaces and 
private ones. Public spaces are primarily created by 
a specific authority (local, regional or state), which 
controls them and establishes the rules under which 
people may use them. Private spaces belong to and 
are controlled by specific individuals or economic 
entities that have the right to establish the condi-
tions under which others may use them. 
 David Harvey offers a dense synopsis of the 
discussion concerning the nature of commons in 
general and common space in particular. He insists 
that the common is not ‘a particular kind of thing’ but 
‘an unstable and malleable social relation between 
a particular self-defined social group and those 
aspects of its actually existing or yet-to-be-created 
social and/or physical environment deemed crucial 
to its life and livelihood’.6 Thus common space can 
be considered as a relation between a social group 
and its effort to define a world that is shared by its 
members. By its very conception, such a world can 
be stable and well defined, completely separate 
from what is kept outside and from ‘outsiders’. This 
is indeed the kind of world that can be contained 
in an urban enclave: enclaves can be secluded 
common worlds, as in the case of a favela, or a 
gated community. 
 However, common space can also be a porous 
world, always in the making, if we consider the rela-
tion that defines it as dynamic, both in terms of the 
formation of its corresponding group or commu-
nity and the characteristics of the common world 
itself. Jacques Rancière revealingly re-theorises 
community through the notion of ‘common world’. 
This world, according to him, is more than a ‘shared 
ethos’ and a ‘shared adobe’. It ‘is always a polemical 
distribution of modes of being and “occupations” in 
a space of possibilities’.7
 Consequently, common space may be shaped 
through the practices of an emerging and not neces-
sarily homogeneous community that does not simply 
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to the rules of social reproduction. People on the 
threshold experience the potentiality of change 
because during the period of their stay on the 
threshold a peculiar experience occurs, the experi-
ence of ‘communitas’.13 People who have lost their 
previous social identity but have not yet acquired a 
new one linger on the threshold of change ‘betwixt 
and between’, almost reduced to the common 
characteristics shared by all humans.14 Social differ-
entiation may appear quite arbitrary during such an 
experience. A kind of equalising potentiality seems 
to dwell on thresholds. Liminality, the spatiotemporal 
quality of threshold experience, is a condition that 
gives people the opportunity to share a common 
world-in-the-making, in which differences appear as 
pre-social or even anti-social.15
 Initiation threshold spaces are defined through the 
ritual practices that bring them into existence. Such 
threshold spaces are under society’s surveillance 
and any form of ‘communitas’ is carefully limited 
to an ephemeral initiatory existence. However, in 
thresholds that give space to and shape institutions 
of expanding commoning, ‘communitas’ is expe-
rienced as an always-in-the-making community 
of participating commoners. Rather than experi-
encing the potentialities of equality by being ritually 
reduced to a common zero degree of humanness 
(as do the initiated in rites of passage), through their 
acts the people involved construct a community of 
equals because they choose to define at least part 
of their life autonomously and in common. Emergent 
communities of creators and users of city space: is 
this not a prospect that would transform city space 
into common space, into space-as-commons?
 For commoning to remain a force that produces 
forms of cooperation through sharing, it has to be a 
process that oversteps the boundaries of any estab-
lished community, even if this community aspires 
to be an egalitarian and anti-authoritarian one. 
Emerging subjects of commoning actions transform 
themselves by always being open to ‘newcomers’ 
but also virus-like existence: they become active 
catalysts in processes of re-appropriating the city 
as commons.
 Thresholds may appear to be mere bounda-
ries that separate an inside from an outside, as 
in a door’s threshold, but this act of separation 
is always and simultaneously an act of connec-
tion. Thresholds create the conditions of entrance 
and exit; thresholds prolong, manipulate and give 
meaning to an act of passage. This is why thresh-
olds have been marked in many societies by rituals 
that attempt to control the inherent potentialities of 
crossing. Guardian gods or spirits dwell at thresh-
olds because the act of passage is already an act 
that creates a potential connection between an 
inside and an outside. Entering may be taken as 
an intrusion, and exiting may convey the stigma of 
ostracism.
 Thresholds acquire symbolic meaning and are 
often shaped in ways that express and corrobo-
rate this meaning. Societies construct thresholds 
as spatial artifices that regulate, symbolically and 
actually, practices of crossing, practices of bridging 
different worlds. And these practices may be 
socially beneficial or harmful. Societies also use the 
image and the emblematic experience of thresh-
olds to metaphorically ascribe meaning to changes 
of social status that periodically and necessarily 
happen to their members. Passing from childhood 
to adolescence, from single to married life, from 
life to death, from apprenticeship to the status of 
the professional, from trainee to warrior, and so on, 
are cases of supervised social transformations that 
mould individuals. Societies often understand these 
changes as the crossing of thresholds: initiation 
procedures guarantee a socially ‘safe’ crossing by 
directing neophytes to the ‘other’ side.12
 As the anthropologist Victor Turner has 
observed, threshold crossing contains an inherent 
transforming potential that is not necessarily bound 
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in defence. Spatial porosity, however, was restored 
every time people were left to develop their inven-
tive and spreading miniature cities: micro-squares 
within a reclaimed public square.21 
 Dominant institutions legitimise inequality, distin-
guishing between those who know and those who 
do not, between those who can take decisions and 
those who must execute them, between those who 
have specific rights and those who are deprived of 
them. Thus, dominant institutions that focus on the 
production and uses of public space are essentially 
forms of authorisation that stem from certain author-
ities and aim at directing the behaviour of public 
space users.22
 It is undeniable that there also exist dominant 
institutions that seem to be grounded in an abstract 
equality: real people with differentiated characteris-
tics, needs and dreams are reduced to neutralised 
subjects with abstract rights. Thus, in public space, 
general rules apply to homogenised users, ones 
who can have access to a specific place at specific 
hours of the day and under specific conditions 
(including the use of discreet or conspicuous 
surveillance).
 In spite of their different roles in social normalisa-
tion, both types of dominant institutions classify and 
predict types of behaviour and deal with only those 
differences that are fixed and perpetuated through 
the classifications they establish. There are obvi-
ously differences in terms of content: an institution 
that aims at guaranteeing a certain form of equality 
(no matter how abstract) is different from an institu-
tion that openly imposes discrimination. 
 Institutions of expanding commoning explicitly differ 
from dominant institutions (institutions of domination) 
as well as from those institutions which articulate 
practices ‘enclosed’ commoning. This makes them 
potentially different ‘social artifices’, which are oriented 
towards creating different social bonds. 
and by becoming newcomers themselves.16 In the 
process of expanding commoning, which directly 
defies capitalist society’s enclosures, thresholds 
may become both the image and the setting of 
emancipating experiences of sharing. Thresholds 
are potential socio-spatial ‘artifices of equality’.17
Institutions of expanding commoning?
This is where the problem of the ‘institutions of 
commoning’ arises.18 By its very constitution as a 
tool of social organisation, an institution tends to 
circumscribe a community as a closed world of 
predictable and repeatable social practices. Thus, 
institutions of commoning may also be employed 
to define specific commoning practices, and the 
corresponding community of commoners be consid-
ered as a closed, self-reproducing world. But this 
may – and often does – lead to forms of enclosure.19
 For commoning practices to become impor-
tant pre-figurations of an emancipated society, 
commoning has to remain a collective struggle to 
re-appropriate and transform a society’s common 
wealth by continually expanding the network of 
sharing and collaboration.20 Although collective 
experiences such as those of Syntagma Square’s 
self-managed tent city (one of the many instances 
of the recent occupied squares movement that 
includes the European ‘indignant citizens’, the Arab 
Spring and the Occupy movement) may represent 
an inspiring example of a culture based on equality, 
solidarity and collective inventiveness, the exem-
plary power of the corresponding common spaces 
persists only when they remain ‘infectious’, osmotic 
and capable of extending egalitarian values and 
practices outside their boundaries. Central squares 
became important for the recent occupy move-
ments because they had the capacity to become 
crucial nodes in a developing network of neigh-
bourhoods and cities. It was police attacks and 
authoritarian government policies that tried to limit 
the metastatic character of those common spaces 
by forcing the occupiers to barricade themselves 
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expanding commoning need to be flexible because 
‘newcomers’ need to be included in them without 
being forced to enter a pre-existing taxonomy of 
roles. Comparability is the motor force of expanding 
commoning.
 However, comparability is not enough. Institutions 
of commoning need to offer opportunities as well 
as tools for translating differences between views, 
between actions and between subjectivities. If 
comparability is based on the necessary and 
constitutive recognition of differences, translat-
ability creates the ground for negotiations between 
differences without reducing them to common 
denominators. ‘An emancipated community is a 
community of narrators and translators.’26 Obviously, 
this is quite difficult since dominant taxonomies tend 
to block the processes of establishing any socially 
recognisable common ground that is not based on 
the predominance of the ruling elites. Translation 
seeks correspondences, but it cannot and does 
not aspire to establish an absolute, unobstructed 
mirroring of one language with another. An institu-
tion does – or should do – the same , thus keeping 
alive the expanding potentiality of commoning. 
Indeed, ‘the common is always organized in trans-
lation’.27 Expanding commoning does not expand 
according to pre-existing patterns; it literally invents 
itself. Translation is this inherent inventiveness of 
commoning, which constantly opens new fields 
and new opportunities for the creation of a common 
world always-in-the-making.
 Another example from Navarinou Park that may 
seem trivial, but which is not, concerns schoolchil-
dren from the nearby public elementary school, who 
were invited to participate in the activities of the 
park yet were not treated as simply potential users 
of the park. They were encouraged to leave their 
mark on the park by planting their own small garden, 
by participating in the construction of colourful 
benches with broken ceramic tiles, and by organ-
ising their own small events in the self-constructed 
 Three essential qualities characterise institutions 
of expanding commoning. Firstly, institutions of this 
kind establish the basis of comparisons between 
different subjects of action and also between 
different practices. Subjects of action and prac-
tices themselves become comparable and relevant: 
what is at stake is to invent forms of collaboration 
based not on homogenisation but on multiplicity.23 
Instead of maintaining or creating distances 
between different subjects and practices (within a 
rigid taxonomy), institutions of this kind encourage 
differences to meet, to mutually expose themselves, 
and to create grounds of mutual awareness. Mere 
coexistence does not capture the potentiality of 
comparison. Differences mean something because 
they can be compared. Differences are relative and 
relational. 
 Let us consider an example: in the case of the 
occupied Navarinou Park in Athens (a parking lot 
converted into a lively urban square and garden 
through a neighbourhood initiative), people could 
have created distinct working groups with participa-
tion based on each one’s knowledge and abilities. 
This, however, would latently reproduce a role 
taxonomy derived from the ‘innocent obviousness’ 
of existing differences. As a young architect who 
participated in the park’s assembly recalls: ‘People 
involved felt that they had to reposition themselves 
outside of their normal position and profession.’24 
Even in her areas of expertise, she was careful 
to express her opinion ‘as one opinion among 
others, and not as the expert’s opinion’.25 What 
makes Navarinou Park an experiment in common 
space creation is that any form of work and coop-
eration is implicitly or explicitly an act of collective 
self-regulation and self-management. Collecting 
garbage can become a test in such a prospect, as 
can also be a discussion regarding direct democ-
racy in the park’s assembly. The rules established 
by the assembly formed institutions of commoning, 
as did the rules that established a rotation of duties 
(as in the collection of garbage). Institutions of 
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to ‘disperse power’ rather than build institutions 
that reproduce centres of power accumulation.29 
He describes how a continuous dialectic between 
centralised, open assembly decisions and dispersed 
initiatives of action by smaller groups keeps a strug-
gling community alive, inventive and open to the 
contribution of each and everyone. Although he 
chooses to see these practices as non-institutional 
or non-institutionalised, a wider interpretation of 
institutions, such as the one employed so far in 
this text, may consider the practices of El Alto’s 
‘commoners’ as open institutions of commoning 
explicitly targeted at the elimination of institutional-
ised power centres. We could even transform his 
remark on communities-in-the-making to a bold 
definition of institutions of expanding commoning. 
He says: ‘Community does not merely exist, it is 
made. It is not an institution, not even an organi-
zation, but a way to make links between people.’30 
Perhaps it is institutions of expanding commoning 
that make egalitarian links between people, thus 
producing an open community. 
 In the recent Occupy movement, as well as 
in many other forms of direct democracy that 
were tested in neighbourhood initiatives, an open 
assembly explicitly tried to establish equality in 
terms of decision-making. Everyone had the right to 
participate. In many cases, decision-making was not 
based on voting but on consensus reached through 
extended, and sometimes exhaustive, debate. To 
establish equality of opinions is a difficult process. It 
depends on who is willing to participate, the impor-
tance of the decision, how decisions are linked to 
specific tasks, and who chooses to assume the 
burden. Moreover, a further important issue is how 
a person forms an opinion. How is this influenced by 
access to knowledge, education and experience? 
What role do physical abilities play? Frequently, 
perceived advantages in all these areas latently 
legitimise certain opinions as superior to others. 
How does one treat the opinion of somebody who 
rarely participates in the everyday hard work of 
outdoor theatre. What passes unnoticed in these 
experiments is that inviting schoolchildren (or any 
newcomer) to get involved poses problems of trans-
lation. What do children discover, express or ask for 
by participating? How can their aspirations be dealt 
with without simply using them as fuel for the initia-
tive’s engine?
 A third characteristic of institutions of expanding 
commoning has very deep roots in the history of 
human societies. Social anthropologists have thor-
oughly documented the existence of mechanisms 
in certain societies that prevent or discourage the 
accumulation of power. Depending on the case, 
these mechanisms are focused on the equal distri-
bution of collected food, the ritual destruction of 
wealth, the symbolic sacrifice of leaders, carnival-
istic role reversals, etc.
 If institutions of commoning are meant to be 
able to support a constant opening of the circles of 
commoning, they need to sustain mechanisms of 
control over any potential accumulation of power, 
either by individuals or by specific groups. If sharing 
is to be the guiding principle of self-management 
practices, then the sharing of power is simulta-
neously the precondition for egalitarian sharing 
and its ultimate target. Egalitarian sharing, which 
needs to be able to include newcomers, has to be 
encouraged by an ever-expanding network of self-
governance institutions. Such institutions can really 
be ‘open’ and ‘perpetually in flux’, but in very specific 
ways connected to the practices of expanding 
commoning.28 Power is first and foremost the power 
to decide. If, however, the power to decide is distrib-
uted equally through mechanisms of participation, 
then this power ceases to give certain people the 
opportunity (whether legitimised or not) to impose 
their will on others. 
 Raúl Zibechi has carefully studied the mecha-
nisms used by the struggling communities in El Alto, 
Bolivia, observing how specific communities chose 
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accumulation of power to community representa-
tives by insisting on a rotation in ‘government’ duties 
(with very short rotation cycles). This may limit effi-
ciency, if efficiency is measured by managerial 
standards, but it effectively educates all the people 
in community self-governance.33 
 Comparability and translation form potential links 
between strangers and therefore create possibilities 
for exchanges between them. Egalitarian sharing 
can support a continually expanding network of 
exchanges that is open to newcomers. What these 
three characteristics of emergent, open institutions 
of commoning establish is forms of sharing that defy 
enclosure and consider equality both as a presup-
position for collaboration and a promise for a just 
society. 
 There is perhaps one more social relation that 
expands and also transforms egalitarian sharing: 
the gift. Most anthropological approaches demon-
strate that gift exchanges are based on explicit or 
latent obligations that enforce (or euphemise) asym-
metries of power.34 There can be, however, forms of 
offering that essentially transgress self- or group-
centred calculations and possibly hint towards 
different forms of togetherness and solidarity. In 
conditions of harsh inequality (including differenti-
ated access to knowledge and poorly developed 
individual abilities due to class barriers), commoners 
of expanding commoning should realise that they 
often need to offer more than they expect to receive, 
to speak less and hear more from those who are not 
privileged speakers, and to contribute to common 
tasks without demanding an equivalence among 
the individual offers.35
 Protest camps in many parts of the world were 
actually sites of commoning practices that encour-
aged the giving of gifts. In the occupied Tahrir 
Square in Cairo, for example, offering food was 
part of a process that extended socially important 
habits of hospitality, usually connecting the realm of 
maintaining a common space? And do those who 
participate more frequently have the right to decide 
against the opinions of others? 
 The main argument put forward for accepting 
forms of concentrated power by participants 
involved in a movement is efficiency. Quick and 
coherent decisions, they say, need to be taken by 
representatives, who, of course, should be elected 
democratically. Yet the experience of the Squares 
movement has shown that an obstinate insistence 
on direct democracy can also create coherent deci-
sions (decisions that do not constantly change the 
targets or the framework) and an efficient distribu-
tion of collectively agreed upon tasks. The Spanish 
15M movement, for example, was organised on 
the basis of daily open assemblies that voted on 
proposals formulated by thematic commissions, 
which had titles such as ‘power’, ‘action’, ‘coordina-
tion’, ‘logistics’, and so on.31 Of course, institutions of 
expanding commoning have to deal with difficulties 
arising from a change in scale. This is a very well 
known problem of direct democracy. If, however, 
power dispersion remains a guiding principle and 
is established through institutions that give form to 
a decentring/re-centring dialectic, then questions of 
scale become questions focused on the organisa-
tion of different levels of participation. 
 Zapatista autonomous municipalities and Juntas 
de Buen Gobierno offer a relevant, very interesting 
and inspiring example. As is well known, Zapatistas 
never chose to base their emancipating struggle 
on indigenous Maya fundamentalism. They chose 
neither to accept the reality of self-referential tradi-
tional societies excluded from Mexican civil society, 
nor to struggle for an independent Maya state.32 For 
Zapatistas, autonomy meant self-governance of 
Zapatista communities and the creation of a second 
level of autonomous institutions, which would inter-
connect and coordinate community decisions and 
activities through the Juntas de Buen Gobierno. 
Zapatistas attempt to limit the possibilities of an 
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to invent forms of life in order to survive. To help 
release the power of doing that capitalism continu-
ously captures and traps in its mechanisms, we 
need to participate in the creation of spaces and 
institutions of expanding commoning.40 If autonomy 
has any meaning as an anti-capitalist venture, then 
it must be constructed in, against and beyond the 
metropolis by overturning the dominant taxonomies 
of urban spaces as well as the dominant taxono-
mies of political actions.
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the family house to the appropriated public space. 
Maybe this is an essential part of the process of 
converting an occupied square or protest camp into 
a collectively crafted home.36 Food offerings thus 
contributed to forms of sharing across space that 
‘enable alternative forms of circulation and distribu-
tion, and encourage forms of relationality different 
from capitalism (in both its welfare and neolib-
eral renditions)’.37 Solidarity is both a prerequisite 
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